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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3467 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL VELEZ, 
 
                 Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 08-cr-00389-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Peter Sheridan 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
November 15, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, RESTANI, Judge
*
 
 
(Opinion Filed: December 13, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
*
  Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International 
Trade, sitting by designation.  
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 Appellant Michael Velez appeals his conviction and sentence of 63 months’ 
imprisonment.  The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court committed 
procedural error when it added three additional criminal history points for a 1994 
Pennsylvania state court conviction.  We conclude that it did not.  
I.  
 Because we write solely for the parties, we discuss only facts relevant to our 
conclusion.  Velez pled guilty to a one count information charging him with conspiracy 
to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349.   
 In calculating his criminal history category, the District Court included, over 
defense counsel’s objection, three points from a 1994 conviction.  In 1994, Velez pled 
guilty to a charge of forgery-altered writing in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4101(A)(1) in 
the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.  He was sentenced to four years probation.  
One year later, Velez violated probation and the court revoked his probationary sentence.  
It then resentenced him to imprisonment “for not less than time served and no more than 
23 months.” JA99.  The judge also sentenced him to 2 years’ probation.   
At sentencing, the District Court determined that Velez’s total offense level was 
22 and he had a criminal history category of V. The District Court sentenced him to 63 
months’ imprisonment, which fell within the Guideline range as calculated. Velez timely 
appealed.
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II.  
                                              
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
3 
 
 We review the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo and its 
factual findings for clear error.  United States v. Navarro, 476 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 
2007).  The District Court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2006).   
In reviewing a criminal sentence, we employ a two-step process.  United States v. 
Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011).  First, we review for procedural errors, such as 
“failing to make a correct computation of the Guideline range.”  Id.  If there is no 
procedural error, we then review it for substantive unreasonableness and will affirm 
unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant.”  Id. 
III. 
 Under the sentencing Guidelines, three points are added “for each prior sentence 
of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1.  A “sentence of 
imprisonment” is defined as “a sentence of incarceration and refers to the maximum 
sentence imposed.”  Id. § 4A1.2(b)(1).  This excludes any portion of a sentence which is 
suspended.  Id. § 4A1.2(b)(2).   
 Here, Velez argues that the sentence he received for his 1994 conviction was time 
served and the remaining months were suspended.  We do not agree.  There is no 
evidence in the record that the judge intended to suspend any portion of the sentence.  See 
United States v. Frias, 338 F.3d 206, 212 (2003)(a suspended sentence is one where “the 
sentencing judge [] mak[es] a firm decision at the time of sentencing regarding the 
amount of imprisonment imposed.”)  Rather, the record shows that the Pennsylvania 
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judge sentenced Velez to an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term of 
imprisonment as time served and a maximum of 23 months.  Because the maximum 
sentence that Velez could have served was 23 months, the District Court did not commit 
procedural error when it included this conviction in calculating Velez’s criminal history 
category.  Velez makes no argument that the District Court’s Guideline sentence was 
substantially unreasonable and we see no basis upon which to conclude otherwise.   
IV.  
Because the District Court neither procedurally erred nor imposed a sentence that 
was substantially unreasonable, we will affirm the District Court’s order and sentence. 
